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Abstract 
In a hierarchical organisation of stable size the annual intake is strictly determined 
by the number of deaths and a statutory retirement age (if there is one). In this 
paper we reconstruct the population of the Austrian Academy of Sciences from 
1847 to 2005. For the Austrian Academy of Sciences we observe a shift of its age 
distribution towards older ages, which on the one hand is due to rising life 
expectancy, i.e., a rising age at death, as well as to an increased age at entry on the 
other hand. Therefore the number of new entrants has been fluctuating 
considerably—especially reflecting several statutory changes—and the length of 
tenure before reaching the age limit has declined during the second half of the last 
century. 
Based on alternative scenarios of the age distribution of incoming members—
including a young, an old, the ‘current’ and a mixed-age model—we then project 
the population of the Austrian Academy and its ageing forward in time. Our 
results indicate that the ‘optimum policy’ would be to elect either young or old 
aged new members. 
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1  Introduction 
The logic of population dynamics implies that in a human population closed to 
migration the only alternative is growing or ageing (ruling out early death). 
Additionally excluding sustained population growth, a continuing trend towards 
top-heavy age pyramids is unavoidable. Subpopulations such as learned societies 
are no exception to this rule. One striking feature of academies of sciences is their 
increasing ‘over-ageing’. Faced with rising life expectancy, particularly for older 
persons, the average age of academy members has increased conspicuously. This 
trend of over-ageing is enforced by an increase in the age at election. 
Currently the Austrian Academy of Sciences (AAS)—similar to other learned 
societies (Leridon 2004; Matthiessen 1998; van de Kaa and de Roo 2006; Cohen 
2003)—is engaged in reforming its policies to rejuvenate its age structure. As 
recently proposed (ÖAW 2007, p.40), the AAS aims at keeping its number of 90 
full members below a statutory ‘retirement’ age
1 but targets a reduction of the 
latter to 65 years thereby freeing up about 45 seats. Several arguments have been 
brought forward in favour of a rejuvenation of learned societies. Van de Kaa and 
de Roo (2006, p.20) argue that an ‘old’ academy might be seen as “… not 
dynamic enough and no longer well-informed … Hence the repeated efforts of 
boards or councils to reduce the average ages by creating more vacancies, by 
creating vacancies more rapidly, and by filling these vacancies with ‘young’ 
candidates.” In a similar vein, Leridon (2004, p.83) argues that the increase in life 
expectancy led to the increase in the average age of learned societies and 
concludes “This is a disadvantage in a field where it is important for an academy 
to stay in touch with the community of working researchers if it is to continue to 
play a useful role as an advisory body in society.” 
The size and age structure of full membership varies considerably across 
academies
2 given international variation in the mortality conditions to which 
members are exposed to and the age structure of intake, which may be heavily 
affected by policies governing its size and (to some extent) structure. 
In addition to variation in mortality, conditions affecting members in each 
country and external circumstances potentially affecting the age distribution of 
intake, such as the age distribution of the pool of potential academicians, there are 
two broad types of policies that may affect the size and/or composition of intake 
in more specific ways. First, academies such as the Austrian and the Russian
3 
have a ‘corresponding member’ status with more limited (e.g., voting) rights 
previous to full membership. While not all corresponding members get to become 
                                                 
1   The byelaws of the AAS define a maximum number of 90 full members. Members exceeding 
the age of 70, though retaining all their rights, are not considered for the maximum number. 
2   See Leridon (2004) on the Académie des Sciences (Institut de France), Cohen (2003) on the 
U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Matthiessen (1998) on the Royal Danish Academy and 
van de Kaa and de Roo (2006) on the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. 
3   And up until 1993, the predecessors of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences. Gustav Feichtinger et al.  109 
full members, the age distribution of those elected to the latter during a given 
period may be further constrained by the composition of corresponding members. 
Second, academies may limit the number of full members to be inducted in a 
given election period in two ways. On the one hand, elections per period may 
have a fixed number of new members. Such is the case of the Royal Society, 
where 44 new fellows have been elected per year in the recent past. Alternatively, 
intake per election period (typically yearly) could be linked to a given (but not 
necessarily fixed) quantity. For instance, the Austrian, Berlin-Brandenburg and 
Norwegian academies have set the number of elections to match the number of 
people reaching a statutory retirement age (currently of 70, 68 and 67 years, 
respectively). This policy has served to maintain the number of full members 
below statutory retirement age constant (currently to 90, 200 and 220 in Austria, 
Berlin-Brandenburg and Norway, respectively). As members who are past the age 
threshold retain all their rights and privileges as full members, this policy has 
served to restrict membership size nominally, as it were, while permitting the 
continuous flow of new membership at the same rate as the ageing of 
academicians close to retirement age. 
Either fixing or linking intake may have (contrasting) implications for both 
the size and age structure of the population of reference, though these 
consequences also depend on the relative size of intake and its actual age 
structure. The higher the intake rate and the lower the mean age at election, the 
larger the rejuvenating effect of intake would be of course.  
The issues discussed for learned societies are very much analogous to those in 
assessing the potential role of immigration in counteracting the effects of ageing 
in larger, geographically-referenced populations (Blanchet 1988; Espenshade 
2001; Schmertmann 1992). As this body of literature has shown, immigration 
(i.e., age-structured intake) may not be a good solution to the ageing problem as 
immigrants, albeit young at arrival, naturally tend to age themselves. Or, in other 
words, a disproportionately higher immigrant inflow would be required to achieve 
the same rejuvenating results as a given flow of births. 
More generally, the question about the sequence of recruitment numbers that 
generates a given stock trajectory plays an important role not only in demography, 
but also in person-flow models and manpower planning. In a remarkable paper, 
Preston (1970) has dealt with an ‘inverse’ problem. Assuming time-invariant 
mortality and zero net migration, he asked what birth trajectory is required to 
generate a prescribed population sequence, which is similar to the question “what 
sequence of recruitment numbers is capable of generating a given stock 
trajectory” in a more general context of person-flow models (see e.g., 
Bartholomew 1982, ch.  3). In particular, Feichtinger and Mehlmann (1976) 
studied the asymptotic behaviour of the recruitment trajectory corresponding to 
given stock sequences, particularly stationary ones. One of the consequences of 
moving towards a stationary population is that individual mobility will become 
more difficult compared with an increasing population. The consequences of the Age dynamics of learned societies  110 
rate of population increase on promotions and career prospects has also been 
studied—more generally (Keyfitz 1973, 1977) and in the context of universities 
(Vaupel 1981) as well as for the French civil service (Henry 1971, 1972, 1975).  
While Academies of Sciences are indeed populations subject to analogous 
conditions as the cases above, they represent a rather particular case of these 
given their small size and more compact (and significantly older) age structure. 
Moreover, as the age distribution of intake can in principle be regulated (or at 
least heavily influenced) by policies and practices, it is worth assessing the past 
and potential effectiveness of these policies in slowing down ageing.  
So far the population of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (AAS) has not 
been investigated in detail. In this paper we present for the first time an in-depth 
study of the historical development of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and 
provide alternative scenarios for its future development. Our focus is on assessing 
the importance of longevity conditions and academy policies regarding the size 
and the age composition of intake as well as the statutory retirement age, on the 
size and age structure of membership. Put differently, the question is: faced with 
increasing longevity and its fixed membership size, how can the AAS design its 
recruitment policy and statutory retirement-age rule to avoid excessive ageing?  
The following investigations shall provide answers to the above question. 
After a few formal comments concerning the reconstruction of the data we first 
look into the historical developments. Chapter 2 is dedicated to full Academy 
members,
4 compiling a number of descriptive statistics and illustrations on their 
development as to numbers, structure and age since the foundation of the 
Academy. We consider both the group of existing members and that of new 
entrants as well as the transition from corresponding to full membership, before 
we go into the mortality of Academy members. A scenario of possible future 
trends in the development of membership structure is presented in Chapter  3. 
Here we show several alternative projections that—based on the specific 
assumptions—yield potential combinations of the total size, age structure and new 
members of the Academy. We conclude with a discussion of the results and an 
outlook for further research avenues. 
 
 
2  Demographic evolution of the Austrian Academy of 
Sciences 1847-2005 
2.1 Reconstructing  the  data 
The data come from the biographic records of the members of the Austrian 
Academy of Sciences (Hittmair and Hunger 1997). The Austrian Academy of 
                                                 
4   See Chapter 2.1 for a detailed description of member categories. As only full members hold the 
right to vote, they have a considerable shaping effect on the Academy’s population structure. Gustav Feichtinger et al.  111 
Sciences was founded in 1847 as the Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften in 
Wien under the auspices of emperor Ferdinand I. The Academy is structured 
around two sections (termed Klassen in German)—the Section for Mathematics 
and the Natural Sciences (math.nat.) and the Section for the Humanities and the 
Social Sciences (in German philosophisch-historische Klasse, phil.hist.). 
Membership distinguishes between honorary members, full members and 
corresponding members. The latter category further distinguishes between 
corresponding members residing in Austria and corresponding members abroad. 
Full membership requires residence in Austria. If a full member moves abroad, 
his or her status changes to that of a corresponding member abroad while living 
outside of Austria.
5 
The biographic records include date of birth and death, year of election, 
section membership, membership status and year of change of membership status. 
Exits from the Academy were mainly through death with few exceptions.
6 During 
the Nazi period, several Jewish members were excluded from the Academy: 
between autumn 1938 and autumn 1940, six full members and 15 corresponding 
members (including corresponding members abroad) were expelled on ‘racial’ 
grounds (Matis 1997). After the end of World War II, the excluded members were 
listed again in the membership directories. Nowadays membership directories do 
not mention those exclusions. When reconstructing the member population during 
that time, we decided to keep these excluded members in the Academy population 
because we did not want to replicate the injustice committed at the time. In 1945 
those members of the Academy who had joined the NSDAP 
(Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) were suspended. With the 
Amnesty Law of 1948, however, the membership of almost all of them was 
restored again. Nowadays membership directories do not give any information 
about these suspensions either.
7 
For the purpose of reconstructing the membership population, we assumed 
that elections always took place in mid-May each year, which has been the case at 
least in recent years. If members moved abroad or returned to Austria, we coded 
the change in membership status to take place in the middle of the year due to 
lack of information on the actual month of change. 
In this way, it is possible to chronologically reconstruct in particular those 
changes of the Academy’s statutes which led to new section sizes, age limits and 
rules of election. Table 1 summarises (the amendments of) the byelaws and gives 
the year in which the relevant change became effective. Apart from the increase 
of the maximum number of members in 1848, 1925 and 1992, age thresholds 
                                                 
5   For a specific case of status changes see that of Ludwig Eduard Boltzmann in Feichtinger et al. 
(2007).  
6   Four full members, two corresponding members, and one corresponding member abroad have 
ever voluntarily resigned from the Academy. 
7   A thorough description of the activities of the Austrian Academy of Sciences from 1938-1945 
can be found in Matis (1997). Age dynamics of learned societies  112 
were introduced. From 1950 onwards, members who were older than 75 years, no 
longer counted for the computation of the maximum numbers while still keeping 
their full membership rights. This age threshold was lowered to 70 years in 1972. 




Changes in the byelaws concerning the number of members per section, age limits 
and rules of elections and the year they became operative 
Byelaws Year




st version (1847) 





24 members per section 
Increase by 6 members per section 
Byelaws, 1
st version (1922) 






Increase by 3 members per section 
Byelaws, 3
rd version (1946) 
- Addendum (1949) 
 
 
- Addendum (1960) 
- Addendum (1971) 
 




















Age limit of 75 years (see text for 
details), maximum of five new 
members elected per year  
Restriction on elections dropped  
Age limit of 70 years (see text for 
details) 
Increase by 12 members per section 
a Year of election (in which the change became effective for the first time).  
b Informal agreement to distribute additional elections over three years (Schlögl 1992). 
 
Below we will examine the population of the Austrian Academy of Sciences 
in closer detail, particularly focusing on the full members. Since only these are 
vested with election rights, they may influence the current member structure by 
electing new members of a certain age group. We will focus on the Academy as a 
whole, i.e., considering both sections together, as they have seen a very similar 
demographic development. 
 
2.2  Population structure and age structure over time 
Figure 1 shows the development of full members from 1847 to 2005. The years in 
which amendments of the byelaws took place are marked. After a rather stable 
process in the first half of the Academy’s existence, these byelaw amendments led 
to a continuous rise in membership numbers. Apart from the direct increases in 
the maximum number of members in the years 1848, 1925 and 1992, the 
introduction of the 75-years age threshold in 1950 as well as its further reduction 
to 70 years in 1972 created a considerable space for potential members to be 
elected. This led to batch-wise growth of the population. Consequently, the 
Academy started with 39 full members in 1847 and grew to 165 full members in Gustav Feichtinger et al.  113 
2005. Among the 165 full members 88 full members belong to the ‘math.nat.’ 
section, whereas 77 are members of the ‘phil.hist.’ section.
8 
A detailed picture of the age development over time is plotted in Figure 2, 
which contains the average and median age of full Academy members with and 
without consideration of the introduction of the age threshold of 75 years in 1950 
and its reduction to 70 years in 1972. Starting at 51 years in 1849, the average age 
rose to 67 years during a time span of one hundred years. With the introduction of 
the age threshold in 1949 the reference population changed: while the overall 
average age continued to increase, the average age of those full members below 
the age threshold decreases with an additional impulse of rejuvenation in 1971. 
The median age follows a similar pattern as the average age.  
Focusing on broader age groups over time shows that the age group of the 60 
to 69-year olds dominates, while the 80+ group keeps increasing steadily, which 


















1848 1925 1950 1992 1961 1972 2005
 
Note: The vertical lines indicate those years when changes in the byelaws regarding the number, age limit and 
rules of election of full members became operative. 
 
 
                                                 
8   Altogether, there have been 8 women among the full members of the Austrian Academy of 
Sciences. Age dynamics of learned societies  114 
The duration of membership as a full member (Figure 3), which we calculated 
for those members who died or reached the age limit in the respective period, is 
determined by the entrance age on the one hand and by the time of death on the 
other. In spite of partly strong variations over time—caused by the small sample 
size—the mean period spent in the population by full members fluctuates around 
20 years during the first half of the 20th century. Afterwards, it rose from 16 years 
in 1946-50 to the recent average of 27 years for all members, while the mean 
tenure of full members below the age threshold now lasts 12 years. 
 
Figure 2: 












Mean age, all members
Median age, all members
Mean age, below age limit
Median age, below age limit
1971 1949
 
Note: The vertical lines indicate those years when the age limit of 75 years was introduced and lowered towards 
70 years, respectively. 
 
So far the reconstruction of the data clearly shows that an increase in the 
membership size and a reduction in the statutory retirement age implied an 
increase in the number of full members over time. To explain the change in the 
age structure and tenure of the members (as represented in Figure 2 and Figure 3) 
we need a closer investigation of the age structure of new entrants, their status 
changes (i.e., moving from a corresponding to full member) and their death 
patterns. In the following two sections we briefly review these developments. 
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2.3 New  entrants 
The number of elected members and their age at election since the establishment 
of the Academy is represented in Figure 4. While the number of elected members 
for each 5-year period up to the beginning of the 20th century lay around 10-20, 
this figure gradually rose to over 20-25 later on. The amendments of the byelaws 
around 1961, 1972 and 1992 allowed to elect a larger number of new members at 
once, resulting in manifest peaks of the number of new entrants. Hence, 23 new 
full members were elected during the years 1961-62, 13 new full members in 
1972 and 43 new full members from 1992 to 1995. 
 
Figure 3: 
Average duration of full membership at time of death or voluntary exit and 


































Note: The vertical lines indicate those years when the age limit of 75 years was introduced and lowered towards 
70 years, respectively. 
 
The age at election of full members increased continuously from its lowest 
value of about 40 years in 1861-65, to above age 60 several times in the second 
half of the 20th century. In the recent past it has decreased again due to the 
reduction in the age threshold that led to the election of younger members. Since 
full members are recruited to a large extent out of the pool of corresponding 
members it is interesting to investigate whether the increase in the mean age at 
election of full members is caused by an increase in the mean age at election of Age dynamics of learned societies  116 
corresponding members or a lower transition rate from corresponding to full 
member. We will discuss this topic in the next section. 
 
2.4  Transition from corresponding to full member 
The transition from corresponding to full member represents a key factor since 
the latter group of members is selected predominantly from the former group and 
thus the age of corresponding members constitutes an implicit control device to 
influence the age of full members.  
Figure 5 shows the age distribution at the time of election of corresponding 
and full members elected between 1980 and 2005. Both the age distribution of 
full members and that of corresponding members exhibit an approximately 
symmetric distribution. Since the major part of the full members is elected from 
the pool of corresponding members, the average age at election of full members is 
higher than that of corresponding members (57 compared to 51 years, 




Number of elected full members (left scale) and mean age of full members (right 


































Number of elected members
Mean Age at election
1848 1992 1925 1950 19611972
 
Note: The vertical lines indicate those years when changes in the byelaws regarding the number, age limit and 
rules of election of full members became operative. 
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The proportion of corresponding members ever to become full members has 
varied quite strongly over time, as shown in Figure 6 (right-hand axis). For 
instance, among those corresponding members elected in 1976-80, 58% 
eventually became full members. Meanwhile, the maximum value in the past was 
about 81% (1866-70), the lowest about 27% (1941-45). Naturally due to right-
censoring and the fact that these are cohort measures, the proportion of 
corresponding members ever to become full members plummets towards the end 
of the measurement period. The same two arguments (i.e., strong variation and 
right-censoring issues) hold for the average waiting period (i.e., the number of 
years that corresponding members ‘waited’) until election as a full member, also 
shown in Figure 6 (left scale). However, fluctuations in waiting times did not 
necessarily mirror those in the lifetime probability of election. That is, long 
waiting times did not invariably imply a high probability of election. For instance, 
while 58% of corresponding members elected in the period 1976-80 were 
eventually elected as full members (after approximately 9 years), those elected in 
the previous 5-year period had waited only 6 years where their probability of 
promotion was above 60%.  
From Figure 4 one may deduce that the increase in members’ mean age 
shown in Figure 2 was partly caused by the increase in the mean age at election as 
full member. In addition, to investigate the impact on increasing survival into old 
age on members’ mean age over time we discuss the mortality development of the 
members in the following section. 
 
Figure 5: 




















Note: 3-year age groups; values plotted above middle of each age group Age dynamics of learned societies  118 
Figure 6: 
Mean ‘waiting period’ of corresponding members to become full members (left 
scale) and share of corresponding members who ever became full members (right 
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Note: The dashed lines indicate the decline in the graphs due to right-censoring. 
 
2.5  The low mortality of Academy members 
In accordance with general population ageing, Figure 7 confirms that the average 
age at death—which naturally determines the end of Academy membership—rose 
continuously within our subpopulation. In 1851-55 a full Academy member died 
at the average age of 63 years, while the age at death was 74 years in 1931-35 and 
82 years in 1996-2000. As a consequence the increasing mean age at death 
contributed—in addition to the increasing mean age at election—to the rising 
average age of full members. 
Following the social gradient argument of mortality (e.g., Antonovsky 1967; 
Kunst 1997), members of a learned society should exhibit much lower death rates 
than most other social groups. Members of a learned society have not only 
reached the highest educational level, they also occupy (or have retired from) 
prestigious positions with high income.
9 
                                                 
9   The socio-economic differences in mortality may not only arise from better living conditions or 
lower prevalence of risk behaviour (smoking, alcohol abuse, lack of exercise and unhealthy 
dietary habits, etc.) associated to higher income and education but also from a selection effect. 
According to the latter, differences in mortality by social position are not so much due to the 
effect of social position on health but rather to the effect of health on the social position. That Gustav Feichtinger et al.  119 
Figure 7: 





















In order to assess whether Academy members indeed exhibit lower death rates 
than the general population, we compare the mortality of Academy members with 
the average Austrian mortality. Due to the low number of female members we 
conduct the mortality comparison only for the male members. Since we did not 
find any statistically significant differences between the survival functions of full 
and corresponding members, the following analysis is conducted for full and 
corresponding members together. This procedure increases our sample size and 
brings about the potential for stronger statistical significance. 
The mortality comparison is based on two measures: (1) the standardised 
mortality ratio (SMR) and (2) period life expectancy. Applying age-specific 
reference death rates to the age structure of the members of the Austrian Academy 
of Sciences (in one or five-year age groups depending on the reference rates), an 
expected number of deaths is derived; the ratio of actual observed deaths to the 
latter gives the standardised mortality ratio. Statistical significance of the latter is 
verified by a score test. Furthermore, by relating age-specific deaths of 
Academicians to the age-specific person-time spent as Academy member within a 
certain period yields period death rates, from which period life tables can be 
constructed. In order to account for the statistical uncertainty due to the small 
sample size, we compute confidence intervals by applying bootstrapping.  
                                                                                                                          
means that people in lower classes are not less healthy because they are in the lower classes, 
but they belong to lower classes because they are less healthy (see e.g. Vallin et al. 2001 for a 
discussion of causes of socio-economic differences in mortality). Age dynamics of learned societies  120 
Table 2 shows the comparison of the number of deaths for corresponding and 
full members in the period 1986-1995 with the life table mortality of the Austrian 
male population of 1991/92 (Statistics Austria 2005, available through the Human 
Mortality Database at the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research 2005). 
In comparison with the total population the SMR is below 1 for all age groups. 
This implies that male Academy members register fewer deaths than if they were 
subject to the average male mortality in Austria. As evident in Table 2, the extent 
of the mortality difference varies with age: the older the members of the 
Academy, the larger the SMR, i.e., the difference in the number of deaths shrinks. 
Declining social differences in mortality with age have been widely reported 
(Marmot and Shipley 1996; Crimmins 2005). One of the reasons that mortality 
differentials are lower at older than at younger ages is a selection effect. “As 
cohorts of persons of different socioeconomic status proceed through life, the 
force of mortality reduces the number of survivors in each group but at very 
different rates. Far fewer people in the lowest status group survive to old age; a 
much higher proportion of high status people survive. Mortality produces a more 
selected group among those with the lowest status; a group which has been 
selected against mortality risk.” (Crimmins 2005, p.165-166). 
 
Table 2: 
Comparison of the mortality of corresponding and full members in the time period 
1986-1995 with the life table of the Austrian male population (and of that with 
tertiary education) of 1991/92 








50–69  11  24.4  0.45**  13.0          0.85 
70–90 42  71.0  0.59**  57.5 0.73* 
total 53 95.3  0.56**  70.5  0.75* 
Legend: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
In summary, from 1986 to 1995, members of the Austrian Academy of 
Sciences aged between 50 and 90 years registered only about half of the deaths 
that the Austrian life table for the total population from 1991/92 would have 
implied. For the period 1996-2005, Academicians show a similar mortality 
advantage in comparison to the Austrian male life table 2001/02 (Winkler-
Dworak 2006). 
In a next step, we aim to examine whether mortality differences even persist 
between members of the Academy and the Austrian population with tertiary 
education. Otherwise, the mortality difference of the Academy members to the 
total population could be explained entirely by the higher education level. 
Therefore, we apply reference death rates of Austrian men with tertiary education, 
which can be constructed from the number of deaths by educational class reported Gustav Feichtinger et al.  121 
by Doblhammer et al. (2005)
10. As evident in Table 2, the SMR—although higher 
than before—is still below unity! Over all age groups considered, corresponding 
and full Academy members registered about 25% fewer deaths in the years 1986-
1995 than would have been expected had they been subject to the age-specific 
death rates of Austrian men with tertiary education in 1991/92.  
Figure 8 compares the period life expectancy of Academy members at the age 
of 60 with the corresponding figures of the total population available for the 
Austrian Alpine regions and Cisleithania during the monarchy and later for the 
Austrian Republic (available through the Human Mortality Database at the Max 
Planck Institute for Demographic Research 2005). Annual estimates of the life 
expectancy at age 60 for the Austrian population have been available from 1950 
onwards (Statistics Austria 2005)
11. For Academy members, life expectancy at 
age 60 is derived from abridged 10-year period life tables, which are constructed 
from observed period death rates of the Academicians. With some exceptions, the 
life expectancy of the Academy members at age 60 is slightly above the 
corresponding value for the Austrian male population. Starting from the mid-20th 
century, the life expectancy of Academy members rose more steeply as compared 
to that of the Austrian population as a whole. Around the turn of the 21st century 
the difference in the further life expectancy at the age of 60 amounted already to 
approximately 6 years. For the population with tertiary education, the life 
expectancy at the age of 60—expectedly—lies between the estimates for the 
Academy members and for the Austrian male population.
12 
Widening social gaps of mortality have been also identified by other studies 
(e.g., Marmot and McDowall 1986; Pamuk 1985). However, most studies on time 
trends of differential mortality are limited to the second half of the 20th century. 
In one of the rare studies with different time horizons, Pamuk (1985) studies 
inequality in mortality by social class in England and Wales from 1921 to 1972. 
She finds that the social gradient of mortality has been increasing in England and 
Wales among men for the 1950s, which is consistent with our findings.
13  
 
                                                 
10   See Winkler-Dworak (2006) for details on constructing reference death rates for the Austrian 
male population with tertiary education. 
11   We are using life expectancy at age 60, since the data availability for the Austrian population 
was best for this age. 
12   Life expectancy at age 60 for the Austrian male population with tertiary education is based on 
death rates constructed from Doblhammer et al. (2005). Since the age-specific numbers of 
deaths by educational class are only given up to age 90 in Doblhammer et al. (2005), a 
Gompertz function was estimated for the older age groups. However, since the Gompertz 
function tends to overestimate old-age mortality, life expectancy estimates for the population 
with tertiary education may be too conservative. 
13   A more detailed mortality analysis can be found in Winkler-Dworak (2006). Age dynamics of learned societies  122 
Figure 8: 
Life expectancy at age 60 of Academy members compared to Austrian life table 







































3  Projections of the future structure and size of the 
Academy 
According to the reform policies of the AAS (ÖAW 2007), there is an interest in a 
young age structure and at the same time the aim is to appoint as many excellent 
scientists as possible without exceeding the maximum number of members below 
the age threshold of 70 years. Consequently, the Academy is confronted with a 
trade-off between a ‘young’ society that only allows a small number of vacancies 
each year and a small number of the total stock of members vs. an ‘old’ society 
that allows more vacancies and thus a larger stock of members each year. The 
connection between the annual number of vacancies and the mean age of 
Academy members is not new. Full member Gerhart Bruckmann summed up this 
dilemma with an illustration: 
With an average age at election of 55 years and ruling out mortality, a member 
has 15 remaining years until the age threshold. At a maximum number of 90 
members, you are bound to see 6 vacancies per year on average. However, if 
entry at earlier ages were favoured (in order to establish a ‘younger Academy’), 
e.g., at 47.5 years, then these new members would stay in the system for 22.5 
years until the statutory retirement age—resulting in 90/22.5 = 4 vacancies per 
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This means that the younger the age at election, the longer the tenure in the 
Academy and thus the lower the rate of rejuvenation. These simple calculations 
are based on the fundamental identity of a stationary population where the stock 
equals the number of births multiplied by the life expectancy and in our case: 
M = RT  (1) 
where M denotes the total size of the Academy, R the annual intake and T the 
mean length of tenure. In the Austrian case we have M = 90, 0 ≤ T ≤ 30 (assuming 
a minimal age at entry of 40 years and an upper age limit of 70 years).  
However, the number of recruits and their age structure as well as the length 
of tenure will vary over the transitional period when policy changes are 
implemented. Moreover the initial age structure will determine the dynamics 
during the transition period. Simulations are the adequate tool to capture the 
development of the population during these transitional periods and to investigate 
the sensitivity of the age structure and size of the members on changes in policies.  
To project the Academy population of full members forward in time we 
postulate the same mortality development as in the latest forecast of death 
probabilities by Statistics Austria (Hanika and Klotz 2005), which were derived 
by employing the Lee-Carter method (Carter and Lee 1992; Lee 2000). The 
projected death probabilities were converted into death rates under the usual 
assumption of a uniform distribution of deaths over the age interval. For the age 
groups above 50, we assumed constant forces of mortality within the age interval 
instead. 
As shown in the last section, Academy members have a significantly lower 
mortality than the general Austrian population. Therefore we adjust the forecasted 
Austrian death rates according to the standardised mortality ratio for the most 
recent period (SMR=0.5). Since the mortality differences decline for higher ages, 
we increase the adjustment factor for increasing age by 2.5 % per year of age 
starting from age 80. This implies an SMR of about 0.74 at the age of 99 years.  
Since the forecasted life table from Statistics Austria (Hanika and Klotz 2005) 
ends at the age of 99, we extrapolate the mortality for higher ages by assuming a 
logistic model (Perks 1932) based on the death rates between ages 80 to 99. 
For the projection of the development of the AAS age structure, we first 
project the number of members at the year t surviving until t+1. The difference 
between the number of survivors below age 70 and the upper limit of 90 members 
altogether gives the number of vacant posts. The latter are filled according to the 
postulated age distribution of members at election, where we consider four 
alternative scenarios (see Figure 9): 
Status quo: Average age distribution (approximated by a normal distribution) 
of new entrants observed during the last 25 years, i.e., 1980-2005.  
Young: Only persons below age 55 are elected — distributed uniformly. 
Old: Only persons aged 55 and above are elected — distributed uniformly. 
Bimodal: Persons between age 40 to 49 and 60 to 69 are elected — distributed 
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The average age of new entrants is about 57.2 years for the status quo 
scenario, 47.5 years for the young scenario, 62.5 years for the old scenario and 55 
years for the bimodal scenario. The corresponding standard deviation is 6 years 
(status quo scenario), 4 years (young and old scenario) and 10 years (bimodal 
scenario).  
Additionally, we consider a fifth scenario (Status quo 65) where we assume 
the status quo setting and a reduction of the statutory retirement age to 65 (instead 
of 70), and where the age distribution of elected members used was a re-scaled 
normal distribution similar to that of the status quo scenario but distributed 
between ages 40 to 64 (as opposed to 40 to 69). 
The projection time horizon runs from 2005 up through 2050 and the initial 
population consists of 165 members. Among these, 45% are older than 70 years.  
 
Figure 9: 




































The projected number of vacancies over the period 2005-2050 is summarised in 
Figure 10 for the four scenarios representing the age distribution of new entrants 
and the fifth scenario where we assume a status-quo age distribution of new 
entrants but alter the reference population to members below age 65 instead of the 
current policy of age 70. The initial development is influenced by the actual age 
structure, i.e., by the number of members who exceed the age threshold of 70 (65 
in the fifth scenario).
14 It is after approximately 5 to 10 years that the influence of 
                                                 
14   Note that the reduction of the reference population to those below age 65 implies 45 additional 
vacancies immediately opening up in the initial period. To visualise the fluctuations of the 
number of vacancies during the following years, however, we limited the scale of the y-axis to 
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the observed age structure of 2005 weakens and the differences between the 
scenarios become visible. Only in the second half of the projection period, 
however, do the effects of the initial age structure entirely disappear. If the 
observed age distribution of new entrants over the last 25 years persists (scenario 
status quo), about 6 vacancies are expected per year by 2050. Assuming the 
young scenario, a phase in which none or at most one new member could be 
elected annually would be reached around 2020! This period would last 
approximately a decade. Contrary to the status-quo scenario, a stabilisation of the 
number of vacancies would take longer under the young scenario and amount to 
about 3 vacancies. This can be explained by the smaller variance and the lower 
entrance age which implies a longer time interval until the members have passed 
the age threshold of 70 years and hence open up a vacancy. Under the old 
scenario in which only members of age 55 and above get to be elected the number 
of vacancies would be highest with 10 seats per year. The bimodal scenario of 
newly elected members would result in a number of annual vacancies similar to 
the scenario of maintaining the current policy, i.e., the status quo scenario. The 
scenario that assumes a reduction of the age threshold to 65 years is rather similar 
to the old scenario. In both scenarios, the mean length of tenure decreases which 
results in an increase of intakes (see the identity of a stationary population in 
equation (1)). In the case of the old scenario, the reduction of the mean length of 
tenure stems from an increase in the mean age at election, while in the status quo 
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The strong differences in the annual number of vacancies under the different 
scenarios representing the age distribution of new entrants accordingly cause 
different developments concerning the total number of members over time 
(Figure 11). With the highest number of vacancies during the initial period, the 
scenario of a reduced age limit would cause a rapid increase of the number of 
members from 164 at the end of 2005 up to 306 members in 2050 corresponding 
to an increase of approximately 87%. A similar pronounced increase can be 
observed for the old scenario where the number of members would increase up to 
291 members in 2050. Under the status quo and bimodal scenarios a more 
moderate increase of members would result: up to 216 or 200 members in 2050, 
respectively. Under the young scenario an initial rise would be followed by a 
decrease in the number of members resulting in only 163 members in 2050 due to 
the rising tenure as well as the diminishing effect of the initial age structure. 
 
Figure 11: 




































The development of the members’ mean age is represented in Figure 12. In 
contrast to the previous two figures, differences between the scenarios are visible 
right from the beginning of the projection time period. As expected, in the long 
run, the young (old) scenario implies the lowest (highest) mean age among the 
four scenarios presented. Clear differences in the members’ mean age are visible, 
however, between the status quo and bimodal scenario. Under the status quo 
scenario the mean age would increase continuously while the development under 
the bimodal scenario would be characterised by phases of shrinking mean ages. In 
the year 2050 the difference in the average age between the two scenarios would Gustav Feichtinger et al.  127 
amount to approximately 3 years.
15 In case of reducing the age limit but keeping 
the age distribution of new members, the mean age would be reduced 
considerably in the short run. In the long run, however, the mean age of this 
scenario would be close to the mean age of the status quo scenario.  
 
Figure 12: 

























In summary, as Figures 10 through 12 indicate, the dilemma between a 
‘young’ Academy that only allows a small number of vacancies each year and a 
small number of the total stock of members vs. an ‘old’ Academy that allows 
more vacancies and a larger stock of members each year becomes obvious. Under 
the assumption of aiming at a rejuvenation of the Academy and allowing for an 
increase in the number of new entrants (in comparison to the status quo scenario) 
the bimodal distribution of the age at entry seems to be a perfect compromise and, 
as we have shown in a different paper (Dawid et al. 2006), it also constitutes an 
optimal recruitment policy if the Academy’s goal were to keep its member 
structure young and to allow a maximum number of recruitments each period. 
A change in the reference population as in the status quo 65 scenario would help 
to achieve the objective of a high number of vacancies but not the objective of a 
persistent rejuvenation. Only in the short run would this policy help to reduce the 
mean age of the members.  
                                                 
15   This difference would still amount to 2 years if the mean age of the two scenarios were chosen 
to be the same.  Age dynamics of learned societies  128 
4  Discussion  
On the basis of a short historical sketch, we have shown that the full membership 
of the Austrian Academy of Sciences experienced a nontrivial ageing process 
during the 20th century due to reductions in old-age mortality as well as to 
increases in the mean age at election. The upward trend in the latter was 
modulated by an academy policy that links the intake of new members to the 
number of members reaching a statutory age threshold: 75 years in 1950-1971 
and 70 years since 1972. This policy set an effective upper limit to ages at 
election, thus stabilising to some extent the general ageing trend in mean age at 
election. In addition, while the policy maintained the number of members below 
the statutory retirement age at a constant level (currently at 90), remarkable 
decreases in the old-age mortality of academicians also implied that a growing 
fraction of standing membership was going to be above that age.  
Generally speaking, learned societies will always aim to maintain a delicate 
balance between being in touch with the community of working researchers while 
rewarding those who have greatly contributed to their fields of endeavour. In the 
case of the AAS, the age of members is thus not only a relevant issue to consider 
as a potential (yet neither unique nor perfect) marker of said quest for balance 
between contribution and distinction across generations, but it also dictates the 
number of new members to be inducted in the near future. Another conundrum 
arises from the fact that a rather low intake may prevent many excellent scientists 
from ever being elected as they age above the statutory retirement age in the 
meantime. 
Under the premise that the Academy is thus interested in keeping a relatively 
young age structure, the current intake limits—aimed at keeping membership 
below the statutory retirement age to 90 persons—seem to be in conflict with the 
other desirable goal of electing as many new members as possible. Applying 
standard cohort-component projection methods, we illustrated the trade-off 
between age at election and size of intake by looking at the effect of new entrants’ 
age distribution on the number of yearly vacancies and on the age structure of 
members. A common feature of the various scenarios we posed is that intake 
would of course invariably depend on the numbers of people close to the 
retirement age. One of the repercussions of said policy is that—in the transient 
state and immediate future—intake will inevitably fluctuate in Easterlin-like 
cycles (see Figure 10), though varying considerably by scenario, from young to 
old. In turn and as hinted before, a younger/older age structure of intake likewise 
implies a younger (older) academy. In the vast majority of periods and scenarios, 
the mean age of the academy would in fact be higher than the statutory retirement 
age, and in some cases considerably so. While maintaining the current election 
practice would in fact not do a bad job in attempting a fair compromise between 
the two aforementioned objectives, a bimodal age distribution of new entrants 
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while yielding a relatively young age structure (for an optimal-control exposition 
of this same issue, see Dawid et al. 2006). 
Our results clearly evidence that age at election is a crucial determinant of the 
number of vacancies and hence membership renewal. As the stationary population 
identity indicates, the longer the tenure in the body, the lower the rate of intake. 
However, a reduction to the stationary case is not appropriate in such relatively 
small societies where fluctuations in the number of vacancies are very 
pronounced over the next three decades. Such fluctuations across time within a 
scenario sometimes exceed the difference of vacancies across scenarios at a given 
point in time (see Figure 10). Our results show that the alternative policy of 
reducing the statutory maximum age to 65, though it would open new vacancies, 
does not help to limit the ageing of academy members in the long term.
16  
As already discussed at the outset, our study is not only relevant for learned 
societies but also for other subpopulations, whose dynamics (i.e., temporal 
development and structuring) can be studied with the demographic methods 
illustrated in this paper. For instance, while geographically referenced (and more 
generally defined) populations can grow due to fertility and migration, the case of 
academies constitute an extreme yet informative case of the potential trade-offs 
that an ageing population (admittedly one that can only grow with one type of 
age-structured intake) faces if it seeks to limit growth and reduce its own pace of 
ageing. In addition, the dynamics of an academy may be analogous to those of 
promotion within organisations such as universities, armies and companies in 
general. A related research question in personnel management studies is how the 
career prospects of the members of an organisation would decrease if the system 
stagnated/shrank after a growth phase (see Feichtinger 1974, 1976; Feichtinger 
and Mehlman 1976; Henry 1971, 1972, 1975; Keyfitz 1973; Vaupel 1981), and it 
could also refer to the problem of the transition from corresponding to full 
member.  In future work we will study these dynamics in more detail as 
corresponding members constitute the ‘pool’ from which the vast majority of full 
members is elected. We also plan to conduct a comparative study among 
academies of other countries (Cohen 2003; Leridon 2004; Matthiessen 1998; Van 
de Kaa and de Roo 2006) in order to look at the results of a wide range of 
academy policies and, to a lesser extent, mortality conditions in the size and 
structure of academies, and how optimal recruitment might vary according to 
those various system characteristics. 
 
 
                                                 
16   In order not to make age such a predominant factor in the election process, van de Kaa and de 
Roo brought forward an interesting policy option (2006, p.36) “… allowing each ordinary 
member to serve actively for a specific period of time, 10 years say, may be a better and more 
equitable solution than forcing everyone in early retirement.” However, the investigation of the 
feasibility of such a strategy is beyond the scope of this paper. Age dynamics of learned societies  130 
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